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INSURANCE LAW-INDEMNIFICATION-MULTIPLE INSUR-
ERS-ASBESTOS CLAIMS-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
adopted the "multiple trigger" theory for liability and held that
each insurer that provided coverage during the triggering periods
was jointly and severally liable for the entire loss.
J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 626 A.2d
502 (Pa. 1993).
In 1979, a suit was brought against J.H. France Refractories
Company ("France") by Charles Temple's estate ("Temple")
claiming that Temple had died from asbestos-related diseases as a
result of his exposure to asbestos-containing products manufac-
tured by France.1 France was insured by various insurance compa-
nies during the time it manufactured asbestos products.2 However,
when France presented a claim based on this suit to the applicable
insurance companies, they each refused to defend or indemnify
France.3 Each relevant insurance policy contained identical provi-
sions which determined when the insurance companies' liabilities
were to be activated.'
In 1981, France filed a declaratory judgment action to determine
the duties of each insurance company.5 The court of common pleas
1. J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 504 (Pa. 1993).
France was in the business of manufacturing products containing asbestos from 1956-1972.
France, 626 A.2d at 504.
2. Id. During the time France manufactured asbestos-containing products, it was
insured by the Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association, St. Paul, Allstate, U.S. Fire,
Wausau, and Rockwood Insurance Companies. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 505. Each policy stated that:
[The Insurer] will pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall be-
come legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury ... to which this
insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and [the Insurer] shall have the right and
duty to defend any suit against the Insured seeking damages on account of such bod-
ily injury....
"Bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by any person
which occurs during the policy period, including death at any time resulting there-
from....
"Occurrence" means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions, which result in bodily injury. . . neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the Insured.
Id.
5. Id. at 504.
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granted summary judgment on the issue of coverage. The Superior
Court of Pennsylvania reversed the decision.' The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania reversed the superior court's determination and
remanded the case." On remand, the trial court designated the ob-
ligations of the various insurers.9 Subsequently, the superior court,
affirming in part and reversing in part, found the insurers liable
but decided that the duty to indemnify should be determined on a
pro-rata basis apportioned upon the amount of time each policy
was in effect.' 0 France petitioned for allowance of appeal and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur."
The main issue considered by the supreme court was the deter-
mination of the obligations of various insurers who provided cover-
age during periods to France for the numerous asbestos and asbes-
tos-related. disease cases filed against France.' The court analyzed
the question by separating it into two distinct issues.' 3 The first
question presented was at what point in the asbestos disease pro-
cess was liability coverage triggered.' 4 The second issue, contingent
on the finding that the insurers' obligations had been triggered,
was to determine how to apportion the obligations among the nu-
merous insurers.15
In determining at what stage of the asbestos disease process the
insurers became liable, the court relied heavily on the medical evi-
dence produced at trial."6 The evidence revealed that an asbestos-
6. J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 539 A.2d 1345 (Pa. Super. 1988).
The trial court found that the insurers had a duty to defend and indemnify and created a
system of apportioning liability. France, 626 A.2d at 505.
7. Id. Relying on the fact that the trial court did not have jurisdiction, the superior
court did not address the merits of the case. Id. The court found no jurisdiction because in a
declaratory judgment action all parties must be joined and there were some claims against
France that had not been joined. Id.
8. Id. The court held that the trial court did have proper jurisdiction despite the
nonjoinder of several claims. Id.
9. Id. See J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 578 A.2d 468 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1990).
10. France, 578 A.2d at 480.
11. France, 626 A.2d at 505. Allocatur is a word used to denote that a writ or order is
allowed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (6th ed. 1990).
12. France, 626 A.2d at 506-07. The court also considered the sub-issues of whether
one of the policies had a valid occupational disease exclusion clause and whether the various
insurers had acted in bad faith for initially refusing to defend or indemnify. Id. at 509-10.
13. Id. at 506-07.
14. Id. at 506.
15. Id. at 507.
16. France, 626 A.2d at 505-07. The evidence was provided by a clinical pathologist
who was an expert in asbestos-related disease. Id. He defined injury as a "process which
alters structure" applying the term regardless of whether he was referring to a cell, tissue,
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related disease is an injury which occurs within minutes of initial
exposure to asbestos and whose destructive powers continue to
progress even though such exposure ends. 17 The evidence further
revealed that bodily injury on a cellular level occurred almost si-
multaneously with exposure to asbestos.18 The court held this con-
stituted a discrete "injury," and that this form of injury triggered
coverage under the insurance policies.19 Upon this evidence, the
court adopted the "multiple trigger" theory of liability, determin-
ing that liability shall exist if either exposure, progression of pa-
thology, or manifestation of the disease occurred while the in-
surer's policy was in effect.2 0
In resolving the apportionment of liability issue, the court ex-
amined the relevant policies and found that the policies contained
no reduction clauses for an injury which occurred during only part
of the respective policy coverage.2 Based upon this, the court
found that once liability of a given insurer was triggered, that in-
surer must be potentially liable for the entire claim regardless of
an additional exposure or injury while another insurer was on the
risk.22
Thus, the supreme court, confronting the issue of indemnifica-
tion between asbestos manufacturers and their insurers for the
first time, 3 adopted the approach whereby liability obligation was
activated upon exposure, progression of the pathology, or manifes-
tation of the disease.24 The court also held that once incurred, each
and every separate policy would cover France's liability in
organ or the body itself. Id. at 505.
17. Id. at 506. A contrary view theorizes that disease progression may be attributable
to the inevitable decrease in respiratory functions due to the aging process, especially when
combined with smoking or infection. Id.
18. Id. Evidence established that individual cells are damaged or killed within min-
utes of being invaded by an asbestos fiber. Id. at 505-06.
19. Id.
20. Id. The court called this the multiple trigger theory. Id. This theory holds that
several stages may trigger liability. Id. The first triggering stage is an inhalation exposure,
whereby cell damage occurred on contact. Id. at 506-07. Next, there is a progression of the
pathology, identifiable by tissue scarring and functional impairment within a month of ini-
tial exposure. Id. Finally there is a manifestation of a recognizable disease, identifiable by
symptoms of severe functional impairment. Id.
21. France, 626 A.2d at 508.
22. Id. The supreme court rejected the superior court's ruling that France should be
included as a self-insurer in apportioning liability for the period of time for which it was
uninsured. Id. The court found this to be a "judicial fiction" upon which there was no basis
for estimating the coverage or limits of such a policy. Id.
.23. Id. at 510.
24. Id. at 507.
1994
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totality.25
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a growing amount of litigation
began to center upon asbestos manufacturers, their insurers, and
their liability for diseases caused by asbestos products. In 1973, the
landmark case of Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Products Corp.26 first
established that an injured worker who had been exposed to asbes-
tos could recover against the asbestos manufacturer.2 7 The issue
involved the duty of an asbestos manufacturer to warn its employ-
ees of the dangers of asbestos.28 The court held that the injured
worker only needed to prove that a given manufacturer's products
contributed to the worker's asbestos-related disease at any time in
order to trigger joint and several liability on the part of that manu-
facturer.29 Thus, under Borel and its offspring, a claimant needed
only to prove that he or she was exposed to an asbestos product
and was injured as a result of that exposure.30 Borel also estab-
lished that the manufacturer had a duty to warn the users of its
products of the long-term dangers attributable to asbestos." This
decision resulted in a mass of toxic tort litigation and laid the
foundation for various theories of insurance indemnification. 2
25. Id. at 508. The court also held that the insurers did not act in bad faith for ini-
tially refusing to defend or indemnify. Id. at 510. The court further found that it was per-
missible for the insurers to decide among themselves which would undertake the defense.
Id. In addition, the court stated that a products hazard restriction clause contained in one
of the policies was valid. Id. at 509-10.
26. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
27. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1081. In Borel, an insulation worker with a 33-year exposure
period sued 11 different manufacturers of asbestos products, alleging that his exposure to
their products caused him to develop asbestosis. Id. at 1081, 1086.
28. Id. at 1081.
29. Id. at 1095-96. The effect of this holding was to shift the burden of proof to each
defendant to show which portion of the harm it caused and to hold each defendant jointly
and severally liable for the total damage if the defendant were unable to show any reasona-
ble basis for division. Id.
30. Id. at 1094. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.
1982) (holding that asbestos products were not cancer-promoting as a matter of law);
Migues v. Fiberboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that Borel cannot be
read to stand for the proposition that in all cases, asbestos products were unreasonably
dangerous as a matter of law); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th
Cir. 1975) (holding the asbestos manufacturer breached its duty to warn of an unreasonably
dangerous product); Beshida v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982)
(holding asbestos manufacturers strictly liable for injuries caused by their products irrespec-
tive of manufacturers' knowledge and actions).
31. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1089.
32. Gail B. Agrawal, Comment, Asbestos: Who Will Pay the Plaintiff?, 57 TUL. L.
REV. 1491, 1495 (1983). The floodgates opened because Borel held that claimants did not
have to identify a specific culpable manufacturer but merely had to allege that they were at
one time exposed to the defendant's products. Id.
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As the number of products liability suits began to escalate, asbes-
tos manufacturers turned to their insurers to provide legal defense
for those actions and indemnification for any losses incurred.33 As
the courts began to struggle with this issue, some decided to appor-
tion liability upon an exposure theory. 4 Under the exposure the-
ory, the insurer that carried the risk during the time of a worker's
initial exposure must defend the entire claim and pay any poten-
tial judgments.3 5 The leading case adopting this exposure theory
was Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations,
Inc."e The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
was faced with the issue concerning the insurance carriers' duty to
indemnify asbestos manufacturers for any subsequent judgment
amounts. 7 The Sixth Circuit adopted the exposure theory princi-
pally due to the medical evidence at trial which conclusively estab-
lished that an injury (in the sense that there was tissue damage)
occurred shortly after initial inhalation of asbestos fibers.3" The
court concluded that it was the injury and not the discovery that
made the manufacturer liable.39
The competing view was embodied in Eagle-Picher Industries v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,40 the leading case adopting the
manifestation theory.41 The court was faced with choosing between
33. See Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d
1212 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1075 (1981).
34. See Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 454
U.S. 1109 (1981) (adopting the exposure theory holding that the burden of apportionment
shall be on the carriers when each insurer has been on the risk for an indivisible injurious
process); Forty-Eight, 633 F.2d at 1226 (holding that it was the injury itself and not the
discovery that made the manufacturer liable).
35. Forty-Eight, 633 F.2d at 1225.
36. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1075 (1981). This case
presented a novel question of insurance law due to the fact that asbestos manufacturers
faced huge potential liability on account of the numerous lawsuits filed by employees who
had been exposed to asbestos products allegedly produced by the various companies. Id. at
1213.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1218. This evidence revealed that asbestosis is a latent disease and that
"each tiny deposit of scar-like tissue causes injury to a lung", prompting the court to find
each such injury as an occurrence for purposes of determining which coverage applied. Id. at
1217.
39. Id. at 1220. The court held that each insurer on the risk at any point during a
worker's exposure to asbestos, including defendant manufacturer's insurance company for
periods of time when it was uninsured, must bear its pro rata share of indemnification costs.
Id. at 1224-25.
40. 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S 1028 (1983).
41. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 12. Defendant filed a declaratory action for defense and
indemnification costs against its numerous insurance companies for the asbestos suits that
had been filed against it. Id. at 16.
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the two theories of insurance coverage. 42 The court in Eagle-Picher
noted that the manifestation theory assigns full responsibility of
indemnification for defense and judgment or settlement costs to
the insurance company whose policy was effective on the date of
manifestation of injury.43 The First Circuit held that the appropri-
ate time for determining which of several policies would be liable
was that date when medical diagnosis of the* asbestos-related dis-
ease became reasonably ascertainable."' The court looked to the
policy language and found that it clearly read that each occurrence
was made up of both an exposure and a resulting bodily injury. 4
The court concluded that it was the resulting bodily injury and not
the exposure which must take place during the policy period.4" The
court pointed out that most insurers favor the manifestation the-
ory, and that this theory had been followed in other jurisdictions
because it meant that only one insurer would be required to defend
and indemnify the manufacturer.47
In the midst of the exposure versus manifestation debate in de-
termining the various insurers' liability, the case of Keene Corp. v.
Insurance Co. of North America4 8 was decided by the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. In Keene, the court addressed
the issue of determining the extent of asbestos disease liability
coverage for each of the policies. 49 This case expanded the realm of
insurer liability by implementing a multiple trigger approach,
namely, that inhalation exposure, exposure in residence, and mani-
festation of a recognizable disease would all trigger coverage under
the insurance policy.50 The court also found that each insurer on
the risk at any time between the initial exposure and manifestation
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 25. The policy at issue was clear in that it required that an exposure result
in an injury during the coverage period. Id. at 24. See note 4 and accompanying text for the
relevant policy provisions.
45. Id. at 17.
46. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 17. The court held that if a single exposure to asbestos
had been intended to trigger coverage, the policy language would have reflected this intent
rather than defining an "occurrence" in part as a "continuous or repeated" exposure to
conditions. Id. See note 4 and accompanying text for the relevant policy provisions.
47. Id. at 16. See also American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 406
N.Y.S.2d 658 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (holding a drug manufacturer's comprehensive general
liability policy was held to be predicated upon result).
48. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982). In this case,
the manufacturer sought defense costs and indemnification, which each of the various insur-
ers who had provided coverage to the manufacturer refused. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1038;
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1043-47.
Vol. 32:639
Recent Decisions
of disease was liable to the manufacturer for the entire defense and
indemnification cost.5 1 The court rejected the exposure theory be-
cause under such a theory the insured would be uncertain as to
liability from exposure occurring before purchase of the policy.
2
The court declined to adopt the manifestation theory because by
the mid-1970s, most insurers had stopped issuing policies that ade-
quately covered asbestos-related diseases.5 3 Thus, the circuit court
recited that if liability were triggered only upon manifestation, in-
surers would avoid the duty of indemnification altogether.5 4 The
tribunal reasoned that when it became known that an action had
occurred which would potentially trigger liability coverage, the in-
surer on the risk at that time was liable for the full loss.
55
In 1985, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Vale Chemical
Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.5 was faced with an
issue of first impression for this jurisdiction in determining which
insurance indemnity theory to apply.5 7 The court reasoned that in
the context of a disease with a long latency period, such as asbesto-
sis, the term "bodily injury" was too vague to precisely identify at
what point the physical damage or disability occurred and when
liability was subsequently triggered. Thus, the court decided to
follow Keene and interpreted bodily injury to encompass any part
of the various injury stages that asbestos-related diseases entail. 9
Later in 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.60 was
51. Id. The court recognized and found joint and several liability upon the fact that
asbestos-related diseases cannot be attributed to just one of the several different exposures.
Id.
52. Id. at 1044-45.
53. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1045 n.22. Although asbestos had been in commercial use
since the early 1900s, it was not until the early 1970s that the dangers of exposure to asbes-
tos became fully recognized. Id. When the surfeit of litigation began, the insurers attempted
to shield themselves from liability by no longer covering such diseases. Id.
54. Id. at 1044. In construing the policy coverage, the court said that one must con-
sider the reasonable expectations of the insured and give effect to the policies' dominant
purpose of indemnity. Id.
55. Id. at 1046-47.
56. 490 A.2d 896 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 516 A.2d 684 (Pa.
1986).
57. Vale Chemical, 490 A.2d at 900.
58. Id. at 901.
59. Id. at 902.
60. 764 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1985). The contracting company in ACandS that installed
insulation products sought indemnification and defense costs for the thousands of lawsuits
filed against it for alleged personal injury as a result of exposure to its products. Id. at 969.
1994
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faced with the issue of insurance indemnification.6 1 This case re-
quired the court to interpret insurance contracts between a Penn-
sylvania company and its insurer.62 The court reasoned that the
goal of such an interpretation was to ascertain the intent of the
parties as evidenced by the writing." The court applied Pennsylva-
nia law which required that ambiguities in an insurance policy be
interpreted in the insured's favor.6 The Third Circuit followed
Vale and Keene and continued the trend towards adopting the
multiple trigger approach to indemnification. 5
The France decision clarified the law of indemnification in
Pennsylvania.6 The decision did not base liability solely upon an
exposure to asbestos. 7 However, such an exposure theory is often
viewed as a favorable one for the insured because it maximizes the
potential coverage for any loss.6 8 The Supreme Court of Pennsylva-
nia also declined to saddle the entire indemnification burden on
the one unlucky insurer whose policy happened to be on the risk
on the date of manifestation. 9 In contrast, the supreme court, in
adopting the multiple trigger theory, used the fairest method of
allocation for all parties involved.7 0 It provided the insured party
with its best chance of recovery by maximizing the potential
amount of coverage. 71 It also acted to soften the financial blow to
the insurers that could have otherwise been found potentially
solely liable under either the exposure or manifestation theory. 2
Accordingly, in Pennsylvania, all losses are spread among all insur-
ers to the fullest extent.73 A later insurer benefits greatly under the
multiple trigger theory because its potential liability is essentially
decreased upon the spreading of losses as opposed to being found
the sole responsible insurer upon manifestation.7'
61. ACandS, 764 F.2d at 972.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 973.
64. Id. See also Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d
563 (Pa. 1983) (holding that insurance policies must be strictly construed against the
insurer).
65. ACandS, 764 F.2d at 973.
66. France, 626 A.2d at 502.
67. Id. at 507.
68. Forty-Eight, 633 F.2d at 1220.





74. France, 626 A.2d at 506-07.
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However, this decision may not be enough to avert the economic
realities of a future financial disaster. The increasing number of
product liability suits brought against asbestos manufacturers
threaten to bankrupt both the manufacturers and insurers and fur-
ther erode our shrinking industrial base. There have been seven-
teen reported corporate bankruptcies stemming from the financial
strain of asbestos litigation, thus putting more pressure on the re-
maining defendants whose own resources are limited.7s The cost of
defending asbestos suits in the future has been conservatively esti-
mated by the United States Department of Labor to be $228 bil-
lion.70 Economic resources are not endless and insurers will eventu-
ally be forced to place much of the burden of their defense and
judgment costs on future consumers. Thus, in the future, this au-
thor contends that the multiple trigger theory of insurance indem-
nification may result in higher premiums, lower coverage amounts,
and possibly a total lack of coverage for not only asbestos manu-
facturers but everyone.
This threat might not be imminent if Congress would become
involved in implementing a federal system for occupational disease
relief which would ultimately lead to prompt, fair and uniform
compensation. Such a system could be operated by an appointed
agency which would assign and collect damages and collect them
from the various manufacturers to be placed in a relief fund. This
agency could then distribute the money in an efficient and expedi-
ent manner according to a predetermined amount depending on
the specific medical diagnosis. Unfortunately, this may result in
some plaintiffs receiving lower awards, but they would receive their
relief much faster than through the judicial relief system currently
in place.
The current litigation system is uncertain because insurers must
defend and indemnify asbestos claims based on the plaintiff's
75. Christopher F. Edley & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion-Dollar Crisis,
30 H Av. J. ON LEGIS. 383 (1993). The seventeen corporations who have filed for reorganiza-
tion under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code because of asbestos litigation were Amatex
Inc., Carey-Canade Corp., Celotex Corp., Eagle-Picher Industries Inc., Forty-Eight Insula-
tions Inc., Johns-Manville Corp., National Gypsum Co., Raymark Industries Inc., Standard
Insulation Co., Unarco-Manville Corp., UNR Industries Inc., Pacor Inc., North American
Asbestos Corp., H.K. Porter Co., Nicolet Inc., Brunswick Fabricators Corp, and Hillsbor-
ough Corp. Id. at 401 n.13.
76. Patrick J. Hagen, Edwin 0. Bailey and Juliet T. Browne, Totaling Up the Costs




choice of forum.7 The fact that plaintiffs may choose to file suit in
a notoriously pro-plaintiff forum makes it increasingly difficult for
insurers to be financially prepared in terms of structuring their
rates or predicting their capital needs.7 8 It has cost approximately
$7 billion in litigation costs for the American legal system to de-
fend asbestos suits in the 1980s and early 1990s.7 9 Of this $7 bil-
lion, 60% of it has gone to lawyers, expert witnesses, and court
costs; almost everyone except the asbestos victims. 80 Eliminating
the judicial system from the resolution of the asbestos controversy
would remove the court costs, attorney fees and administrative ex-
penses and put the money back in the pockets of the victims. This
would also serve the purpose of shortening the time period be-
tween filing of the claim and receiving relief.
This author concludes that if the current system of judicially
handling asbestos claims is left intact, the possible ramifications of
an uninsured nation, unemployment and a further de-industriali-
zation become quite real. It is now up to everyone to reevaluate
this troubled system.
Martin L. Ryan
77. Agrawal, cited at note 32, at 1517.
78. Id. at 1517-18.
79. Edley & Weiler, cited at note 75, at 384.
80. Id.
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